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RESPONDENT REPEATS THE MISTAKE OF THE TRIAL COURT AND 
DISTRICT COURT BY RELYING ON PRIOR OPINIONS FOR HIS 
ARGUMENTS RATHER THAN ON THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE 
COURT. 
Appellant's (Ms. Walton) main argument in her appellate brief was the contention that 
the trial judge did not consider the evidence on the record and instead relied on his past 
impressions of Ms. Walton to make his judgment. Appellant argued that although there was 
evidence on the record to contradict these past impressions, the judge simply repeated his rulings 
from prior hearings. The Respondent (Mr. Gotch) falls into the same habit and does not cite to 
the evidence on the record but merely repeats the judge's rulings, ignoring the evidence on the 
record that is contrary to those rulings. 
Since the issue on appeal is whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion by 
ignoring the evidence on the record, it would behoove us to compare the evidence to the judge's 
findings. 
The judge found that that although the grades were poor, their deportment had improved 
and both children were receiving appropriate support and guidance from Mr. Gotch. The 
evidence, however, showed that the girls grades were, in fact, falling and that the homework 
sheets that Mr. Gotch was supposed to be helping with were not being turned in or they were 
being turned in blank many times. Appellant demonstrated this on the record by submitting 
sheet after sheet of homework and school reports that came back as "O" and "F". Ms. Walton 
also attached a homework summary to her appeal to the district court that demonstrated a lack of 
any progress in the performance of the children at school. See Reply Brief for Appellant, March 
4 
8, 2016, attached Homework Summary. The judge ignored this evidence and simply fell back on 
his prior ruling that stated that Mr. Gotch was providing proper support. 
The judge found that Ms. Walton failed to talk to teachers about her concerns prior to 
filing the petition. This is completely contrary to the evidence on the record which showed that 
Ms. Walton had repeated and continuous positive contact with the girls' teachers. Both Kendra 
McMillan and Molly Pannkuk, testified that Ms. Walton came in weekly and sometimes twice a 
week to review the grades and that she regularly conferred with the teachers about the girls' 
progress. See Transcript of Day One of Hearing of Motion to Modify. p. 162, L. 21-25; p. 163, 
L. 1-9. The trial judge was present to hear all this testimony but chose to ignore it and make up 
facts that fit his opinion of Ms. Walton, claiming that she had failed to talk to the teachers. 
Finally, the judge ruled that only a short period of time had elapsed since the previous 
hearing. The evidence showed that this "short period of time" was three full quarters of school, 
almost the entire school year with absolutely no improvement in the grades. While this may not 
be a large amount of time in the court system, this is a huge amount of time in terms of the 
children's education and future. 
II. RESPONDENT'S EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED BECAUSE HER TESTIMONY IS NOT BASED ON ANY 
SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND BECAUSE SHE HAS NO PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATTERS SHE TESTIFIED TO. 
Contrary to Mr. Gotch's assertion, Ms. Walton has objected to Ms. Masom's testimony from 
the very beginning. Ms. Walton attorney first raised the issue by calling into question Ms. 
Masom's testimony at the trial level. Ms. Masom testified that it was her clinical impression that 
 was being encouraged to fail by her mother and that Abby's poor performance was due to 
her attempts to please her mother. Transcript of Day Two of Hearing on Motion to Modify, 
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pg.345, L. 12-21 Ms. Walton's attorney established, through cross-examination, that Ms. 
Masom was basing her "clinical impression" on a gut feeling and had never talked to  or so 
much as laid eyes on her. Transcript of Day Two of Hearing on Motion to Modify, pg. 343, L. 
15-24 Her opinion was based solely on interaction with Ms. Walton in co-parenting counseling 
sessions. Transcript of Day Two of Hearing on Motion to Modify, pg.333, L. 10-23 
The issue was raised again during oral argument in front of Judge Stegner of Latah County 
District Court when Ms. Walton's attorney argued that Judge Robinson should not have relied on 
the testimony of Ms. Masom because offher lack of training in child psychology and her lack of 
personal experience with  Now Ms. Walton raises the issue again and by Respondent own 
arguments, Ms. Masom is shown to be disqualified as an expert witness or a lay witness. 
A. Ms. Masom relied on a gut feeling. not on any scientific. peer-reviewed method to 
draw her conclusions and cannot be considered as an expert witness 
Expert witnesses are held to a very high standard and are required to back up their 
opinions with research, evidence of the effectiveness of their analysis methods, and showing that 
their methods have widespread acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals. Inc .. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
The purpose of these standards is to prevent an expert from misleading a jury with junk 
science or simply swaying their opinions with his credentials. An expert must be able to prove 
that his findings are accurate for them to be of any use to the trier of fact, either judge or jury. 
Ms. Masom presumed to give an expert opinion on Abby's state of mind, stating that she 
believed that  was trying to fail in order to please Ms. Walton. This opinion was not based 
on any examination of  herself but was just a suspicion based on Ms. Masom's interactions 
with Ms. Walton. Ms. Masom herself described it as a "gut feeling" "not based on facts" and 
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that she had "no idea what happened outside of co-parenting sessions". There was no scientific 
analysis, no method that could be clinically tested, no peer-review of her methods, nothing. Ms. 
Masom may be an expert in co-parenting counseling but not in child psychology and even a child 
psychologist could not make an evidentiary finding about a child's state of mind and motivation 
without ever having seen or spoken with the child. Because Ms. Masom's testimony basically 
took the form of an untested hunch, her testimony should not have been considered as expert 
evidence and the reliance of the trial judge and district court appellate judge on this evidence 
constitutes reversible error. 
B. Ms. Masom cannot testify as a lay witness to the state of mind of a child when she 
has never spoken to or met the child and lacks any personal knowledge of the 
matter 
Ms. Masom is also not qualified to testify as a lay witness because she had no personal 
knowledge of the matter. The Respondent cites the case of State v. Ehrlick as support for his 
contention that Ms. Masom testimony was admissible. In that case, a woman joined in a search 
for a neighbor's missing child. The child was supposedly attending a birthday party in the 
apartment complex. Based her knowledge as a long-time resident of the apartment complex and 
her conversations with several other children, the court allowed her to testify as a lay witness that 
she did not believe that there actually was a birthday party. State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900 
(2006) 
The important distinction between State v. Ehrlick and the facts of the present case is that 
the witness was allowed to testify because she had personal knowledge of the apartment complex 
and had personally spoken with several other witnesses. Her testimony was limited to what she 
personally had knowledge of and it did not rely on any scientific knowledge or special training. 
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Ms. Masom is much more similar to the doctor in State v, Johnson. The doctor was a 
general practitioner who was called to the stand to testify to his belief that certain children had 
been sexually abused. His belief was based on his professional opinion formed by reviewing the 
medical histories of the children that were supplied to him by third parties. The Court ruled that 
this was inadmissible. The Court held that because the doctor was a general practitioner and had 
no special training with regards to sexual abuse or children, he could not testify as an expert. 
Furthermore, the doctor could not testify as a lay witness because he had no personal knowledge 
of the matter based on his own perceptions. His testimony was based on his opinion after 
reviewing the children's medical history but he never personally examined the children or spoke 
to them. Finally, the doctor's testimony was inadmissible because of his profession. The Court 
ruled that the unsubstantiated testimony of a doctor would carry a large amount of weight with a 
jury because of his profession and therefore created a much greater risk of unfair prejudice than 
another witness might. On these grounds, the Court refused to admit the testimony. State v. 
Johnson. 119 Idaho 852 (Ct. App. 1991) 
Ms. Masom's situation is much the same. Her "clinical impression" was not based on 
months of personal knowledge or discussions with the children, like the woman in Ehrlick but 
was based on information she gleaned from discussions with third parties, like the doctor from 
Johnson. Ms. Masom herself admitted that she didn't know what happened outside of the 
counseling sessions with Mr. Gotch and Ms. Walton but that she had a gut feeling that  was 
motivated to fail. Ms. Masom never spoke with  never consulted a child psychologist who 
had examined  and had never so much as laid eyes on  Ms. Masom's only 
information came from her interactions with Ms. Walton and unfounded suspicions. 
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Like the doctor, Ms. Masom may have experience working with children in the past but 
this does not qualify her as an expert without some showing that she has had special training in 
child psychology so as to understand Abby's emotional and mental state. The doctor in Johnson 
had undoubtedly worked with children before in his general practice but the Court required that 
he have some specialized knowledge with regards to children or sexual abuse before he could 
testify as an expert. Similarly, Ms. Masom has undoubtedly worked with children before in her 
counseling sessions but she has not had any special training in regards to child psychology that 
would allow her to testify to the inner motivations and emotions of a child she has never met. 
Ms. Masom's years of training and experience as a counselor actually tells against 
admitting her testimony. Just like the doctor in Johnson, she is a professional and her opinion 
carries the danger of unfairly prejudicing the trier of fact and swaying his opinion based on her 
credentials, not the reliability of the evidence. The trial court and the district court should not 
have admitted her testimony and their failure to exclude the evidence constitutes reversible error. 
III. APPELLANT'S CASE WAS REASONABLY BROUGHT BECAUSE 
APPELLANT HAD A LEGITMATE ISSUE OF FACT IN THE FAILING 
GRADES OF HER CHILDREN. 
Ultimately, the main issue in this case is whether or not Ms. Walton's case was 
reasonably brought. Under Idaho Code §12-121, attorney's fees can only be awarded to the 
prevailing party when the court finds, "from the facts presented to it, that the case was 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Idaho Code §12-121 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that fees cannot be awarded if there is any 
legitimate, triable issue of fact. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 P .3d 833, (2003). 
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This is true even if the losing party has asserted other claims that are indeed frivolous or 
without foundation. Thus, if a losing party can show just one legitimate issue of triable fact, 
attorney's fees cannot be awarded under Idaho Code § 12-121. This is a low threshold for a 
losing party to cross and it is meant to allow most claims to be litigated without the fear of 
crushing legal fees if the claim should lose. To allow attorney's fees to all prevailing parties 
would have the unjust effect of preventing all but the most airtight cases from being brought 
for fear of the consequences of losing. The Court in McGrew recognized this and ruled that 
fees could only be awarded where the losing claim is clearly frivolous and there is not one 
legitimate, triable issue of fact. It is not necessary that the issue be likely to win, only that it 
be legitimate and based in facts. Id. 
In the case presently on appeal, Ms. Walton had a legitimate triable issue of fact in the 
form of her children's falling academics. Ms. Walton had seen nothing but failing grades 
from both her daughters and had expressed her concern to the girls' teachers. Those teachers 
had assured her that the girls' deportment was improving and that Mr. Gotch was helping 
them with their homework. However, Ms. Walton continued to see failing grades and the 
homework sheets, that Mr. Gotch was supposedly helping with, were being turned in 
incomplete or even blank and were often not returned at all. Most of the sheets did not have 
a parent signature, as was common for the homework sheets. Ms. Walton could not see any 
signs that Mr. Gotch was fulfilling his parental duty to help with the children's education and 
the girls had been failing for three full quarters, almost a full school year. It was at this point 
that Ms. Walton finally filed her Motion to Modify, seeing no other way to intervene to help 
her children. 
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The legitimate, triable issue of fact was simply this: Was Mr. Gotch fulfilling his duties 
to assist in the girls' education and could the girls thrive in his custody? Even if the ultimate 
decision of the court was to deny the motion, that doesn't render this issue frivolous. Based 
on the girls' performance and the lack of any sign of meaningful improvement, Ms. Walton 
had a legitimate issue of triable fact and that alone should have prevented any award of 
attorney's fees at the conclusion of the case. But instead, the trial judge ruled based his 
ruling on his personal opinion of Ms. Walton and ignored the evidence, as has been discussed 
earlier in this brief. This constitutes an abuse of discretion and is a reversible error. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Based on the fact that the trial court and the district appellate court ignored the evidence 
on the record and relied on prior opinions of Ms. Walton, Ms. Walton respectfully asks this 
court to reverse the decision of the trial court and deny the award of attorney's fees. 
Based on the fact that the trial court and the district appellate court relied on inadmissible 
expert witness testimony, Ms. Walton respectfully asks this court to reverse the decision of 
the trial court and deny the award of attorney fees. 
In the alternative, based on the fact that the trial court and district appellate court relied 
on inadmissible expert witness testimony, Ms. Walton respectfully asks this court to reverse 
the decision of the trial court to admit the evidence and to remand the case to the magistrate 
court for proceedings consistent with this ruling. 
Respectfully submitted this '1th_ day of February, 2017. 
Paul Hanes, ISB# 10011 
Signing on behalf of 
Gregory R. Rauch 
Attorney for Appellant 
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